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1. Memory and Injustice: a New Moral Sensibility 
In his essay, “The Contest of the Faculties”, published in 1798, Immanuel Kant 
presents an intriguing reflection on the French Revolution. The moral significance of the 
revolution, he suggests, is to be found, not in any event directly connected to it, but in the 
reaction of “disinterested sympathy” towards the revolutionary cause on the part of 
onlookers. Because this response was potentially hazardous and had nothing to do with self-
interest, Kant sees it as the result of a “moral disposition within the human race”, and thus 
as a moral phenomenon that can never be forgotten.1 Presumably for Kant, this serves as 
grounds for hope of moral progress in the form of movement towards a global “federal 
union” of independent republics, a union that would secure universal peace.2
Though I am no latter-day Kant, my central aim in this paper is to identify a novel 
moral phenomenon that is surely as significant, though considerably less exhilarating, than 
the circumstances noted by Kant in 1798. I am referring here to the remarkable rise of a 
series of practices and institutions operating at both the national and global level, designed to 
respond to war crimes, atrocities, human rights abuses, and grave injustices committed by 
states or political movements against minorities and individuals. Arguably, this is a 
development that takes its inception in the Nuremberg Trials and the passage of the United 
Nations Genocide Convention in 1948. The Eichmann Trial of 1961 also played an 
important role in alerting people to the idea that past human rights abuses require a response 
in the present; indeed, most of the manifestations of memory politics that concern me here 
have occurred since this trial.3 In the last three decades, there has been an explosion of 
demands for official apologies for past injustices, calls for compensation or restitution of 
stolen land or property, the appearance of more than twenty truth commissions, the creation 
of the tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, and various other attempts to 
scrutinize past injustices, including “lustration”, talk of “universal jurisdiction”, etc. Michael 
Ignatieff refers to this, rather optimistically, as a global human rights revolution.4 Others talk 
of an “Age of Apology”, or a neo-Enlightenment international morality of “restitution”.5 
However one labels these changes, they have certainly introduced a novel attitude into 
politics.    
 Let me emphasize that I do not assume that this change, however we understand it, 
is either permanent or unambiguously progressive. On the contrary, it is fragile, reversible, 
vulnerable to manipulation, and ambiguous in its significance. The pressures unleashed by 
the 9/11 attacks and by America’s chosen response to them – “the War Against Terror” – 
threaten a full-scale reversion to America’s Cold War habits of overlooking human rights 
abuses as long as they are committed by friends. The “humanitarian intervention” in Iraq 
(one of the many belated second-string justifications for the war) also indicates that the 
language of human rights may easily serve as a cover for the exercise of power. More 
seriously still, threats of global climate change, struggles over scarce resources, depletion of 
fossil fuels, etc., all have the potential to reverse the current concern over human rights and 
redressing past wrongs.6
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Still, for the time being, the new moral sensibility remains important. The mere fact 
that the Bush administration calculated that they could gain political capital from an appeal 
to humanitarian considerations and from creating a tribunal to try Saddam Hussein suggests 
that the new politics of memory is an ideological force to be reckoned with. If this is so, then 
it is important to take note of this development and to place some of the prevailing attempts 
to make sense of it under critical scrutiny.  
The altered moral sensibility I am concerned with here arises from a number of 
different political struggles – the demands of indigenous or decolonized peoples for official 
apologies and restitution, African-American calls for reparations for slavery, demands arising 
out of the twentieth century’s major wars, or from ethnic conflicts and regime transitions. 
The new memory politics also manifests itself on at least three different levels: the symbolic 
level, the level of criminal justice, and the redistributive or compensatory level. In this paper, 
I am going to confine my attention to the implications of the new memory politics at the 
level of criminal justice, as this emerges in the aftermath of regime transitions. I will also 
address some aspects of the symbolic dimension of memory politics, as I take this to be the 
moral core of the new sensibility.  
 In the context of regime transitions, the central challenge confronting new 
democracies concerns the dilemma of how to deal with injustices and atrocities committed 
by authoritarian or totalitarian predecessors or by agents of a liberation struggle, a dilemma 
usually faced in the context of societal division and alienation from state institutions, 
especially the institutions of justice.7 There are in principle at least seven different options 
open to new democracies: amnesia or inaction; pardons; full amnesty; prosecution and trials 
(either domestic or international); lustration (disqualifying collaborators from public office); 
publicity (the opening of the Stasi files in Germany is the key example here); conditional 
amnesty or truth commissions.8  The truth commission option has been identified by many 
as an especially appropriate response to the problems posed by political transitions, and I 
shall concentrate on this here, though this by no means precludes reflection on prosecution 
or full amnesty. I also propose to devote most of my attention to claims made about the 
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), as this has been identified as a 
model of sorts for subsequent attempts to deal with transitions.9
There is a great deal that can be said about the politics of truth commissions and the 
practical challenges that they face.10 My focus here is on the claim that truth commissions 
provide a model of “transitional justice”, and in particular, on two prominent attempts to 
articulate the moral significance of truth commissions – the contextualist, or “transitional 
justice” argument, and the “restorative justice” model. I hope also to defend an alternative 
way of thinking about the TRC as a remedial attempt to achieve a “principled compromise” 
between the values of justice and “reconciliation” or social unity, or in more practical terms, 
as a complement to prosecution rather than an alternative to it.11
 
2. Challenging and Defending Conditional Amnesty: Moral 
Compromise or Transitional Justice? 
Truth commissions have emerged over the last two and a half decades in the wake of 
regime transitions from totalitarian and authoritarian rule. Advocates of these institutions 
have typically viewed them, on the one hand, as an alternative to the politically unfeasible 
option of full prosecution of human rights offenses. On the other hand, they have been 
reluctant to accept calls for a blanket amnesty for offenders, regarding such a course of 
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action as degrading to victims and their families or as threatening to the ideal of achieving a 
more just society; here, what I described above as the “new moral sensibility” has made its 
presence felt. Truth commissions have thus emerged gradually, in the contested space 
between full prosecution and amnesty. Although their mandates and institutional design 
have varied considerably, they have all shared the goal of uncovering and making public 
information about past abuses and they have all been seen as a response to a situation in 
which either amnesty has already been granted to offenders or it is deemed impossible to 
prosecute offenders for some other reason. 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission drew deliberately on the 
experience of past truth commissions, but also differed from them in important ways. For 
present purposes, the key difference was that an explicit and deliberate link was made 
between the proceedings of the TRC and the granting of amnesty. In order to obtain 
amnesty, an offender had to apply to the TRC, participate in its hearings, and meet with its 
requirements, including the requirement of full disclosure. It is this deliberate connection 
between amnesty and the TRC that must be defended if the moral justifiability of the 
institution is to be established. If, as Robert Rotberg claims, the “South African commission 
has become the model for all future commissions”, this is an especially important task 
(Rotberg 2000: 6). 
Although the TRC had to face many different criticisms in the course of its brief life-
span, the fundamental objection is surely that it sacrificed the right of victims and survivors 
to justice, understood in the sense of punitive justice. This is the moral core of the legal case 
against the TRC brought jointly by the Azanian People’s Organisation and the Biko, 
Mxenge, and Ribeiro families, a challenge that was, however, rejected by the South African 
Constitutional Court, on the grounds that the Interim Constitution had made a choice for 
reconciliation and democratic consolidation over prosecution and punishment. The Court 
went on to argue that the terms of the Interim Constitution required the removal of civil as 
well as criminal liability, effectively withdrawing all normal forms of legal redress from 
victims. Although Archbishop Desmond Tutu and others defended this move by appealing 
to an ideal of ubuntu, or “humaneness”, this line of argument clearly did not persuade all of 
the critics of the TRC that they had not been required to relinquish rightful claims of justice 
for a goal whose legitimacy was not obvious to them. For example, Churchill Mxenge, 
brother of assassinated activist, Griffiths Mxenge, objected, “…Unless justice is done it’s 
difficult for any person to think of forgiving” (Rosenberg 1996: 88). Others, at various stages 
of the hearings, objected to the TRC’s privileging of “reconciliation” over justice in similar 
terms.  
It seems to me that whether we regard the TRC in particular, and the truth 
commission model in general, as a morally appropriate response to the injustices endured by 
victims and survivors depends crucially (although not exclusively) on the response we give to 
these objections. Although I believe that the practice of granting conditional amnesty 
engaged in by the TRC may indeed be morally defensible, the way in which this is justified 
has decisive implications for the views we adopt concerning social unity, law, and the 
standing of individuals in a new democracy.  
Defenses of the TRC and the truth commission model against the charge that it 
unjustifiably sacrifices justice tend to fall into two broad groups. The first cluster of 
responses concedes that a moral compromise or trade-off of some sort has occurred, but 
goes on to argue that the particular compromise on which the TRC is founded is morally 
defensible. My concern here, however, is with the second set of defenses, which denies that 
the TRC has to be seen as a form of moral compromise at all. Instead, advocates of this view 
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insist that the idea of the TRC embodies a distinctive and coherent understanding of justice. 
For some, the TRC promotes “transitional justice” – the justice appropriate to societies 
undergoing transition. For others, the TRC seeks “restorative justice”, a notion that ought to 
replace retributivist theories of criminal justice.  
The contextualist or “transitional justice” model is most closely associated with Ruti 
Teitel, who has offered a series of influential defenses of it over the past five years12 The 
central thrust of Teitel’s argument is the claim that the context of a “shift in political orders” 
pose a series of distinctive jurisprudential, legal, and moral problems, problems that present 
institutions of law with tasks radically unlike those that they normally carry out in settled 
democratic orders.13 In the highly politicized transitional context, institutions must provide 
some continuity in legal form, but must also facilitate “normative change”.14 This means that 
courts must find ways of overcoming problems of “retroactive justice” (prosecuting people 
for acts that were not crimes at the time, as a matter of positive law), must decide whether to 
prosecute the leadership or the people who carried out their orders, and must promote social 
peace as well as justice. Teitel claims that these imperatives indicate that transitional justice 
has a different set of priorities from conventional practices of justice. Her point seems to be 
that these priorities – above all, the need to promote and strengthen democratization – allow 
greater flexibility to the courts in deciding how to sanction past acts.15 In particular, 
punishment need not be exercised to the fullest extent if this is likely to threaten the process 
of democratization. Other responses, such as official apologies, amnesties, and reconciliatory 
measures may be appropriate measures of transitional justice, if they are more consistent 
with the goal of promoting stable democracy.16 Teitel comments that these practices 
“…point to a fragmentary but shared vision of justice that is, above all, corrective. What is 
paramount is the visible pursuit of remedy, of return, of wholeness, of political unity – an 
impetus incorporating values external to those of ideal theories of justice” (Teitel 2000: 225).  
In a more recent statement of her position, Teitel  associates distinct measures – 
such as trials and truth commissions – with historical phases of “transitional justice”, 
suggesting that political actors from the late 1970’s on deemed the “Postwar transitional 
justice” of the Nuremberg model inappropriate to their concerns, and opted instead for a 
series of responses in which “justice became a form of dialogue between victims and their 
perpetrators” (Teitel 2003: 80). In this second phase of transitional justice, she suggests, the 
forward-looking aims of reconciliation and forgiveness manifested in the practice of truth 
commissions became central, to the extent that they displaced legal notions of guilt and 
responsibility. Teitel sees truth commissions as a valuable attempt to incorporate the concern 
with human rights evident in the postwar phase within a broader, communal framework 
focused on rebuilding political identity based on local understandings of legitimacy. She also 
hints that truth commissions were somehow linked to critical responses to globalization, 
though she does not explain this assertion.17 However, she is critical of the second phase for 
emphasizing the goal of peace more than that of democracy, and suggests that we have now 
entered a new phase of transitional justice in which the expansion of the law of war through 
the ICC and forms of universal jurisdiction provides the basis for a global rule of law, 
though she worries that this may “normalize” transitional justice in the service of the war 
against terror.  
I am frankly puzzled by Teitel’s argument(s). In particular, in her most recent 
statements, it is unclear whether she is simply engaged in describing a historical sequence of 
imperfect attempts to respond to past injustices or whether she thinks that the different 
phases of transitional justice have normative force within their historical context (meaning 
that it would simply be a mistake, in phase two, to promote the forms of prosecution 
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pursued in phase one). But this puzzle pervades all of Teitel’s work. She seems to suppose 
that the distinctive problems of the transitional context necessitate practices and therefore 
generate a distinctive understanding of justice – “transitional justice”. This view is open to 
two different kinds of challenge. 
First, it is possible to challenge Teitel’s sharp distinction between periods of 
“transitional” and “normal” justice. In a recent article, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule 
concede that there are differences of degree between regime transitions and intrasystem 
transitions, but argue that some large-scale intrasystem transitions, such as constitutional 
amendments, or the passage of controversial landmark legislation such as Brown v. Board of 
Education involve challenges just as significant as those faced in regime transitions.18 Posner 
and Vermeule suggest that the need to balance values of justice, stability, democracy, etc., is 
a pervasive feature of “normal” systems of justice too.  While their main aim in making this 
argument is to answer criticisms that “transitional justice” practices overburden judicial 
systems by confronting them with insoluble moral and practical dilemmas, the implication of 
the argument is that the contrast between a transitional and a normal condition is 
overdrawn. While the circumstances of regime transition may make it difficult to pursue 
punitive justice, it is an exaggeration to think that this simply cannot be secured, or that it is 
a misreading of the situation to call for prosecutions. While the circumstances of transition 
may be distinctive in some respects, they do not necessarily render calls for punitive justice 
mistaken or misplaced.  
This brings me to the second challenge that can be raised against Teitel’s conception 
of “transitional justice”. The real issue, I think, is not the dubious claim that the 
circumstances of transition are unique and have nothing in common with those of 
established democracies.19 Rather, defenders of this view of the TRC must demonstrate that 
the content of transitional justice does indeed constitute a complete, distinctive, and coherent 
conception of justice. However, although I think there is a great deal to be learned from an 
examination of the ways in which truth commissions do respect justice, I do not think that 
the claim that transitional justice forms a unique and complete conception of justice can be 
sustained. 
The South African academic, André du Toit,  offers a particularly stimulating attempt 
to establish the claim that transitional justice is a free-standing and coherent conception of 
justice, based on distinctive moral principles and responding to distinctive “moral needs” (du 
Toit 2000: 124; 138). In his view, transitional justice must be understood as a dual 
commitment to “truth as acknowledgment” and “justice as recognition”(2000: 126-128; 132-
139). In circumstances of transition from authoritarian or totalitarian rule, societies typically 
suffer from a deficit of truth – factual knowledge about past atrocities is lacking, officials 
resist acknowledging the existence of such events (even when this is a matter of widespread 
knowledge), and victims seek acknowledgment of their suffering. The crucial point to grasp 
is that in these circumstances, truth commissions do not simply seek to uncover factual or 
“forensic” truth, but the acknowledgment of truth, an acknowledgment, which, when it is 
secured, is experienced by victims as a “restoration of their human and civic dignity” (2000: 
133-134).  
The conception of justice embodied by truth commissions is closely allied to this 
sense of truth as acknowledgment; it is “justice as recognition” – that is to say, “the justice 
involved in the respect for other persons as equal sources of truth and bearers of rights” 
(2000: 136). More specifically, “transitional justice” amounts to a commitment to the 
restoration of the human and civic dignity of victims by giving them an opportunity to 
emerge from a realm of silence and make their experiences audible. In this respect, the TRC 
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has of course gone further than other truth commissions, by giving victims a public forum 
from which to tell their stories of suffering or survival. This is a form of “recognition” that 
goes beyond abstract (Kantian) moral respect, according to du Toit. Within the TRC, victims 
are accorded the right to tell their own stories, “framing them from their own perspectives 
and being recognized as legitimate sources of truth with claims to rights and justice” (2000: 
136). In practice, he adds, this “requires a fundamentally different orientation to that of the 
criminal justice system in the form of victim-centered public hearings – nonadversarial and 
supportive forums …” (2000: 136). The point of these hearings is not so much to arrive at 
factual truth, but to allow the “narrative truth” of the victims to be heard and afforded 
public attention and respect. 
I am very much in agreement with du Toit’s proposal that we should see truth 
commissions as institutions intended to secure a kind of public recognition for victims. 
Moreover, I think that it is correct to point out that the proceedings of the TRC afford a 
kind of recognition to victims that is not available through the procedures and institutions of 
criminal justice. Truth commissions are a remedial response to situations in which respect 
for justice has been undermined and in which the rule of law and the principle of equality 
before the law have been eroded. Part of their importance consists in their role as rituals of 
recognition of the suffering of victims of violence and abuse – hence the emphasis on giving 
people a chance to tell their stories. This is evidently not a central concern of a court of law, 
but it is necessitated here by the deliberate attempts on the part of the past regime to exclude 
these people from moral consideration – to impose a kind of political death on them.20 Thus, 
truth commissions serve as public rituals of entry into political life, rituals that reverse the 
attempt to remove victims from the sphere of moral agency and equal concern by 
encouraging them to stand up and tell their stories. Courts of law in stable and relatively just 
societies generally do not have to engage explicitly in this kind of remedial activity. 
But although truth commissions provide a form of recognition different from that 
afforded by courts of law, it would be a great mistake to think of this function as a substitute 
for, or a fully coherent alternative to, procedures of law and criminal justice. Part of the 
rationale of truth commissions is that they serve as remedies for situations in which the rule 
of law has been absent or severely distorted. Their task therefore is not only to focus 
attention on the stories of victims, but also to signal the restoration of victims to an equal 
footing with all citizens before the law. The underlying goal is then to vindicate the 
importance of justice and of the legal recognition previously denied victims. 
My concern about the “transitional justice argument” is that it threatens to overlook 
this connection between truth commissions and legal justice. Defenders of the idea of 
transitional justice are often quick to express their dissatisfaction with aspects of criminal 
justice. For example, complaints that courts of law are not “victim-centered” or that the 
practice of cross-examination is unsatisfactory because it subjects people to added trauma, 
abound in the literature on truth commissions.  
No doubt there is considerable truth in these assertions, as well as a need to reform 
procedures of criminal justice in the light of such criticisms. But I am concerned that this 
line of argument often signals a lack of appreciation that a system of criminal justice also 
affords individuals a kind of recognition, and obstructs an understanding of the nature and 
significance of the recognition provided by law and criminal justice. Thus André du Toit 
favorably contrasts the “supportive” and “non-adversarial” procedures of truth commissions 
with the adversarial aspects of trials (cross-examination, for example) and defends the 
relaxation of rules of evidence and the audi alterem partem rule (2000: 136). Others are quick to 
applaud the supportive atmosphere of truth commissions from a therapeutic point of view.21 
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However important these considerations are, there seems little awareness of what has been 
lost when the requirements of law are relaxed. For the rule that the other side must be heard, 
strict standards of evidence, and practices of cross-examination aimed at detecting 
inconsistencies in testimony are all part of a form of recognition afforded by law – recognition 
of all rights-bearers as equal moral agents, able to offer a reliable and rational account of 
their conduct.22 Moreover, legal recognition of someone as a rights-bearer amounts to a 
form of respect, and is conducive to a sense of self-respect on the part of the rights-bearer. 
It contributes to the sense that he is an active moral agent, able to make claims.23 But it also 
means that he is accountable for those claims – hence the emphasis of law on the impartial 
assessment and adjudication of claims and testimony. 
Truth commissions are special institutions aimed at introducing those unjustly 
excluded from legal recognition into the realm of civic respect. When we see these 
institutions as remedial or as preparatory, we emphasize the role they may play as rituals of 
induction into legal recognition. But it is risky to see the relative absence of an adversarial 
atmosphere from truth commissions as a virtue in its own right – as a complete and superior 
substitute for the procedures of criminal justice. Victims tell their stories in the TRC in the 
knowledge that they will not receive all that is due to them, as a matter of justice. This may 
in fact be damaging to self-respect and the cause of equal respect unless it is made very clear 
that the purpose of the hearings is to display the injustices of the past and demonstrate the 
importance of the rule of law and legal recognition. While recognition is indeed the business 
of truth commissions, it is also the business of law and criminal justice, and the recognition 
afforded by truth commissions should serve as a complement and auxiliary to legal 
recognition. Thus, the claim that truth commissions are committed to “truth as 
acknowledgment” and “justice as recognition” does not demonstrate that they constitute a 
morally autonomous enterprise. 
This leads to a second question that must be answered by defenders of the 
“transitional justice argument” if their claim that transitional justice constitutes a complete 
and coherent model of justice is to be sustained. Why is a commitment to punishment not a 
necessary part of transitional justice? It will not do to reply that transitional justice is 
concerned with “justice as recognition” whereas criminal justice is concerned with 
punishment. As we have seen, criminal justice as normally understood also constitutes a 
form of recognition, so the strong contrast suggested here between justice as recognition and 
conventional criminal justice cannot be maintained. Moreover, some broadly “retributivist” 
theories of criminal justice argue that the primary purpose of punishment is expressive, and 
that its main purpose is to vindicate the innocent. Punishment, in other words, may itself be 
related to a moral project of recognition – a project that is carried out not only at the 
symbolic level but also through the imposition of material penalties. 
I want to return to this point later. All that I want to emphasize here is that the 
“transitional justice argument” – even in the very sophisticated form proposed by André du 
Toit – does not satisfactorily account for the absence of punishment from the TRC. Until 
advocates of this view of the TRC offer such an account, their claim that truth commissions 
embody a distinctive and coherent conception of justice must be regarded as incomplete. 
It is at this point, however, that the second major defense of truth commissions rises 
to meet the challenge. Defenders of the “restorative model” of truth commissions do offer a 
justification of the absence of punishment from the practices and goals of the TRC. 
According to this view, it is simply a mistake to think that justice requires punishment; rather, 
the goal of criminal justice is “restoration”. But what does “restorative justice” mean? What 
implications does this view of justice have for our conception of the goals of the TRC? And 
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does it offer an alternative to the view that the TRC is a compromise between justice and 
reconciliation, or social unity? 
 
3. “Restorative Justice” and Truth Commissions  
   The idea of restorative justice has emerged through a series of diverse practical 
initiatives to reform sentencing policies and criminal justice systems in Australia, New 
Zealand, Canada, and the USA.24 It has attracted the attention of criminologists, theologians, 
and legal scholars, and has come to exercise a considerable influence on the thinking of 
many involved in the TRC. Indeed, the first volume of the Final Report of the TRC devotes 
a great deal of attention to the idea of restorative justice, and declares that a principal aspect 
of the TRC’s moral task was to promote “the restorative dimensions of justice”.25 According 
to the Final Report, perceptions that the TRC sacrificed justice were mistakenly based on the 
assumption that justice must be understood as retributive justice and failed to grasp the 
importance of restorative justice.26 Restorative justice is then defined as a process aimed at 
achieving four goals: the redefinition of crime so that it is seen not as an offence against a 
“faceless state”, but as wrongs or injuries done to other persons; “…the healing and 
restoration of all concerned – of victims in the first place, but also of offenders, their 
families, and the larger community”; the encouragement of “victims, offenders and the 
community to be directly involved in resolving conflict, with the state and legal professionals 
acting as facilitators”; the promotion of a criminal justice system that “aims at offender 
accountability, full participation of both the victims and offenders and making good or 
putting right what is wrong”.27  
The core commitment of the idea of restorative justice is the idea of a kind of 
“restoration” made necessary by an act of injury. The restoration that is sought after such a 
disturbance is understood to mean the restoration of the offender, victim, and community.28 
But what does it mean to “restore” offenders, victims, and community? To what are they to 
be restored, and how is this to be achieved?  
In practice, the distinctive feature of practices and institutions associated with the 
idea of restorative justice has been an emphasis on victim-offender reconciliation. Advocates 
of restorative justice place great emphasis on voluntary encounters between victims, 
offenders, and community representatives. During these meetings, sometimes referred to as 
“restorative justice conferences”, offenders are forced to confront the implications of their 
crimes for others, and victims and community members participate, under the guidance of 
mediators, magistrates, and judges, in arriving at a decision aimed at repairing damaged 
communal bonds and returning offenders to the community .29 Advocates of restorative 
justice see these “reintegrative shaming rituals” as a means of overcoming feelings of 
humiliation on the part of offenders and feelings of rage and indignation on the part of 
victims by involving all in a constructive communal initiative.  
The ultimate purpose of this initiative is not to punish offenders, but to reintegrate 
them into the community and to repair damaged communal bonds, in this way “restoring” 
the dignity of all involved in the process. While some “penalties” may be necessary 
components of this process of reintegration, they are justified only as steps towards 
restoration.30 The process is one of moral transformation, while the goal is the 
reestablishment of trust and community. 
It should be easy to see why this understanding of justice has found favour with 
some supporters of the TRC. In the first place, proponents of restorative justice emphasize 
the morally transforming quality of participation in the intimate settings of restorative justice 
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“conferences”. According to John Braithwaite, “victims are punitive interlocutors in 
traditional Western justice systems because they are denied a voice in the outcomes. When 
they are given voice in a conference, they tend to go in angry and come out more forgiving” 
(Braithwaite 2000: 123). Offenders, too, are more likely to experience shame and remorse for 
their crimes when confronted with those who have suffered as a result of their actions and 
with those whose opinions carry weight with them. For Braithwaite, “Part of the genius of 
restorative justice institutions is that they induce expectations that we will all try to put our 
best self forward” (2000: 125). In similar vein, some have seen the (remarkable) capacity of 
the TRC to produce transformative encounters between victims and perpetrators as its most 
ambitious and valuable moral contribution.31
  In the second place, both theorists of restorative justice and many proponents of 
the TRC model place great emphasis on the value of community. What distinguishes the idea 
of restorative justice from earlier utilitarian views of criminal law which emphasized the 
instrumental goods of deterrence or social protection, or the goal of individual rehabilitation, 
is its focus on the good of community and communal reintegration. Although advocates of 
restorative justice are often less than clear about what constitutes the relevant “community” 
in a given case, or how it should be represented, involvement of community representatives 
is seen as a vital aspect of the sentencing process and the restoration of communal integrity 
and trust is considered to be the ultimate goal of the criminal justice process.32 This notion 
of communal reintegration or healing seems to provide content to the TRC’s goal of social 
“reconciliation” and to talk about collective healing and catharsis. Moreover, it is readily 
assimilable to religious and therapeutic discourses within the TRC that tend to understand 
reconciliation on a model of intimate personal relationships.33  
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the “restorative justice model” of the 
TRC redefines criminal justice as a process of social reconciliation, and therefore denies that a 
moral trade-off between justice and social unity or reconciliation has occurred. Although this 
view shares with the “transitional justice argument” an insistence that the TRC embodies a 
morally distinctive and autonomous enterprise, there is an interesting difference between the 
two positions. Proponents of the “transitional justice argument” who focus on the role of 
the TRC in promoting “justice as recognition” tend to see the Victims Hearings of the 
Human Rights Violations Committee as most central to this enterprise and are critical of 
those aspects of the TRC process that seem to have detracted from this.34 Proponents of the 
“restorative justice model”, such as Jennifer Llewellyn and Robert Howse, on the other 
hand, deplore the structural division between victims and perpetrators – that is to say, 
between the Human Rights Violations Committee and the Amnesty Committee – and the 
absence of an opportunity for dialogue between victims and offenders and their respective 
communities. Moreover, the fact that reparations decisions are taken by yet another 
committee is seen as a further source of weakness. Llewellyn and Howse worry that this 
division of functions results in limiting the connection between amnesty and the restoration 
of the victim, and shames perpetrators without devising strategies for reintegrating them into 
the community.35 Their ideal TRC, it seems, would consist of a large “restorative justice 
conference”, in which the functions separated in the real TRC would be united. 
There are three difficulties with this account of the moral significance of the TRC. 
The first is suggested by the concern to unite the functions of providing victims with an 
opportunity to speak and deciding on reintegrative “penalties” for offenders, and by so 
doing, provide an object-lesson that justice is not punitive. Theorists of restorative justice 
generally emphasize the voluntary character of processes of restorative justice. Offenders 
and victims must choose to participate in the process if it is to secure restoration. But why 
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should offenders make this choice, unless they face the threat of some form of punishment? 
Perhaps the hope is that their moral sensibilities can be aroused without resorting to threats. 
This may indeed be the case where a crime has been committed in a tight-knit community by 
a member of the community. In such a case, the offender might want to reestablish standing 
in the community, and might be genuinely affected by the views expressed by community 
representatives.   
This, however, is where talk about “reconciliation” in the context of the TRC can be 
deeply misleading. While some amnesty applicants were concerned to be accepted into a 
community to which they had once belonged but from which their actions had estranged 
them, many were not. In most cases of human rights violations perpetrated by whites against 
blacks, or by blacks against whites, it makes little sense to say that there was a breach of trust 
with a preexisting community or that offenders came forward in order to reestablish 
standing with the community. Nor is it clear that what Braithwaite calls “reintegrative 
shaming” can function in this context, because the communities that the offender is 
affiliated with are quite likely to see nothing shameful about the offense.36  
The more general conclusion to draw from this is that restorative justice cannot offer 
an exhaustive normative model of truth commissions – or indeed of criminal justice. 
Perpetrators typically came forward, not out of an uncoerced choice, but because of the 
threat of prosecution through the regular criminal justice system. This gives weight to the 
view I argued for earlier – viz., that the proceedings of the TRC should be seen not as a 
substitute for a system of punitive justice (including trials and prosecutions), but as a 
complement to it.  
The second problem with the “restorative justice model” of the TRC is related to the 
issue of voluntary participation. I think that it can be agreed that restorative justice processes 
function best where there is a community to which the offender wishes to be restored. In 
such cases, the idea of reconciliation modelled on intimate personal relationships subscribed 
to by theorists of restorative justice seems appropriate (although I shall argue that we may 
still worry about the extent to which it may license community control over recalcitrant 
individuals). In the case of the TRC, however, the goal of reconciliation is intended for an 
entire society – for an extremely divided society, moreover. As I have already noted, this 
suggests that the kind of incentive for reconciliation that exists when offenders are anxious 
to reestablish ties to a community, is not a resource that can be relied upon in the context of 
truth commissions (although it may be present in some cases).  
But a similar point may be made about the process and goal of reconciliation. While 
experiences of moral “transformation” and reconciliation may result in the intimate settings 
of restorative justice conferences, it is surely less reasonable to direct a public, society-wide 
institution such as the TRC towards securing “thick” reconciliation and communal solidarity. 
This is not to deny that the TRC hearings have often produced remarkable – possibly 
transforming – confrontations between offenders and victims. It is simply to insist that this 
cannot be seen as the chief moral purpose of truth commissions. Restorative justice 
processes may sometimes secure moral transformation and reconciliation in intimate settings 
for individuals and communities. They are much less likely to do so when they are 
transposed to public settings and aimed not only at individuals and clearly defined 
communities, but at whole societies.  
The picture of restorative justice as the achievement of “thick” relationships of 
communal solidarity, moreover, seems not only inappropriate for complex or divided 
societies, but also incomplete as an analysis of justice. Richard Rorty has recently argued that 
the concept of justice is simply the same as the idea of a “larger loyalty” – an expansion of 
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the category of who we care about (Rorty 1998: 54-55). There is some truth to this account, 
but it focuses too much on how members of a dominant group may consider a claim of 
justice made by someone excluded from that group – as a demand to “join the club”. From 
the point of view of the excluded or injured, their claim of justice against the dominant 
group may not express a desire to join the in-group at all. It may simply be a demand for fair 
treatment and a recognition of basic dignity. Should victims “reconcile with” perpetrators in 
anything more than the minimal sense that they should recognize them as equal citizens and 
bearers of rights? They may do so of course, and such reconciliations may be either 
humbling or troubling (or both). But I do not think that justice requires such a reconciliation. 
Reconciliation or solidarity is an independent good, when it is a good at all.   
Talk of community brings me to the third problem with the “restorative justice 
model” of the TRC. Advocates of restorative justice sometimes speak as if the promotion of 
community and communal concord is the chief task of a criminal justice system. Daniel W. 
van Ness, for example, describes the goal of restorative justice as “the restoration into safe 
communities of victims and offenders who have resolved their conflicts” (Van Ness, 1993: 
258). Other theorists of restorative justice, see the function of law and criminal justice as the 
peaceful resolution of disputes, or as a form of “conflict resolution” (Cragg 1992: 178).37 
There is nothing intrinsically misleading about such claims. However, when they are 
presented as a full account of criminal justice, they prove to be deficient. While a criminal 
justice system may indeed aim to reduce violence and resolve conflicts, this cannot be its sole 
or even its basic function. For the task of resolving conflict does not distinguish a criminal 
justice system from processes of civil law. Moreover, processes of conflict resolution do not 
necessarily have any connection with concerns of justice. One way in which communal 
conflict is all too often resolved is through the selection of a scapegoat with little attention to 
the guilt or innocence of the person involved.38 As I understand it, although it may fail in 
this regard, criminal justice is aimed at preventing this from happening. 
The point is of course not that practices of restorative justice simply encourage the 
victimization of innocent individuals. Rather, it is that to the extent that theories of 
restorative justice emphasize the goal of harmony and community restoration to the neglect 
of other aspects of criminal justice, they prevent us from perceiving the importance of these 
other functions – especially those of establishing guilt and innocence, and expressing 
condemnation of the crime in order to “annul” it.39 This is what disturbs me about the 
impatience with the “conflictual” or non-restorative aspects of (liberal) criminal justice often 
evident in the work of restorative justice theorists or in interpretations of the TRC 
influenced by restorative justice. Such impatience threatens to obscure the importance of 
stringent procedures designed to establish guilt and innocence as impartially as possible, of 
making a public statement about the nature of a crime, and of vindicating the innocent in a 
public forum. In other words, they distract our attention from some of the basic safeguards 
and goals of liberalism. 
This is not to deny that practices of criminal justice need reform with respect to 
giving greater consideration to victims in the sentencing process, relying less on incarceration 
as a form of punishment, and integrating offenders into society by encouraging them to take 
responsibility for their actions – all the usual themes of restorative justice. These valuable 
criticisms, however, do not amount to a comprehensive theory of criminal justice. They do 
not demonstrate that we should reject the retributivist idea that punishment is a requirement 
of criminal justice, but rather that we should moderate it. As far as the TRC is concerned, 
the account provided by the “restorative model” does not justify treating it as the vanguard 
of a new understanding of criminal justice completely disconnected from prosecution and 
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punishment. Nor does it give us reason to think that the failure of the TRC to “reconcile” 
victims and offenders and secure widespread moral transformation really was a failure.  
 
4. Recognition, Retributivism and Truth Commissions: “Annulling the 
Crime” 
My concern so far has been primarily critical. I have argued, first, that what is due to 
victims of state-sponsored injustice or political violence is not merely “recognition” and 
“acknowledgment” – if that is taken to mean purely symbolic recognition. I have argued, 
second, that the value of justice should not be conflated with that of reconciliation or 
restoration. The practical point of both theoretical arguments is to insist that truth 
commissions should not be considered simply as replacements for punitive criminal justice. 
Rather, truth commissions are somewhat unstable but nevertheless defensible compromises 
between justice and social unity.  
It would be foolish to deny that deeply divided societies need an infusion of trust, or 
that some form of social reconciliation is morally desirable. The question is: what kind of 
reconciliation or communal consensus is to be promoted? The answer, I think, is a 
minimalist consensus about the unacceptability of political cruelty and injustice – a 
consensus concerning the intolerable. Such a goal retains elements of the values of both 
justice and reconciliation, without confusing the two. I believe that this is what truth 
commissions should promote, and they can do so only when they are supportive of the value 
of criminal justice even in those areas where they fall short of its most stringent 
requirements. In practice, I think this means that at least some failed amnesty applicants as 
well as some who never applied for amnesty should be prosecuted or held liable for their 
actions. 
  This is perhaps an uncomfortable conclusion. But I think that it follows from a 
broadly retributivist understanding of the nature of criminal justice which denies that justice 
can be purely a matter of symbolic recognition or that punishment is not required as a 
matter of justice. What I want to do now, by way of conclusion, is – very briefly - lay out the 
basic elements of this positive view of criminal justice which has underlain my more critical 
observations. 
One of the criticisms I made of the theory of restorative justice was that it focused 
too much on the goal of reconciliation or conflict-resolution. Although theorists of 
restorative justice often claim that their account of criminal justice is more respectful of the 
needs of victims than views that portray criminal justice as a matter involving the state, their 
forward-looking emphasis on communal restoration may actually take the attention away 
from some of the most pressing needs of victims. Victims may indeed need restitution, as 
well as a restoration of confidence and a sense of security. But crucially, they need to have 
their sense of dignity vindicated.  
What theories of restorative justice typically omit is an account of the nature of crime 
as an injury – an assault on the dignity or standing of the victims. Some such account is 
perhaps implicit in Braithwaite’s emphasis on the need for offenders to be brought to 
repentance through reintegrative shaming - but it is left largely implicit. Theories of 
restorative justice rarely focus our attention backwards, on the crime itself. Retributivist 
theories, on the other hand, whatever their shortcomings in other respects, give explicit 
attention to the seriousness of crime as an attack on individuals’ dignity. 
Retributivist theorists such as Jean Hampton and Jeffrie Murphy build on the insight 
that a crime is, among other things, an expressive act. What it signals is a claim to superiority 
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on the part of the offender – a signal that the perpetrator is of greater worth than the 
insignificant victim and is not bound by requirements of respect towards the victim. As 
Murphy notes,  
One reason we so deeply resent moral injuries done to us is not simply that 
they hurt us in some tangible or sensible way; it because such injuries are also 
messages – symbolic communications. They are ways a wrongdoer has of 
saying to us, “I count but you do not”, “I can use you for my purposes”, or 
“I am here up high and you are there down below” (Murphy 1988: 25). 
 
For example, the act of rape sends the message that the victim is nothing more than 
an object of use for the rapist. The act does not simply involve physical injury and the 
infliction of pain, but is humiliating or degrading. It may be the intention of the violator to 
make the victim feel humiliated and demeaned – many of the cases of state-sponsored 
violence examined by the TRC involved such intentions. But even when such acts are not 
intended to be demeaning and even when they are not felt to be demeaning, the message that 
the act conveys to society is one of humiliation. The claim that it makes is a claim that the 
agent should not be treated like others because he is superior, and that the victim may be 
treated without respect because she is of inferior standing. The claim, to put the matter in 
Hegelian terms, is a claim of lordship – and such a claim is a challenge to a society 
committed to the values of equal citizenship and equality before the law. 
Such a challenge requires a response. To use Hampton’s terminology, the challenge 
must be defeated; in Hegel’s language, the crime must be “annulled” (Hegel: 1967: 69). But 
how? I think that two components must be present in any morally adequate response – 
publicity and retribution. Publicity is necessary because the challenge issued by a crime is 
directed not only against the victim, but also against the values of equal citizenship and 
equality before the law. Criminal justice rather than recourse through civil law is necessary; 
the state, as legitimate representative of the citizens, must act to defeat the challenge to equal 
respect. It is important to avoid misunderstanding on this point – communal shaming is not 
“public” in the sense that I use the word here. Rather, a public penalty is one authored by a 
legitimate state. 
This is where attention to the ways in which the TRC effects recognition of victims 
is extremely valuable. The TRC is a public response to human rights violations committed in 
the course of apartheid rule and the struggle against it. Both the state and the liberation 
movement committed such violations. Both engaged in actions that denied the worth of the 
victims - but with a crucial difference. In the case of the liberation movement, attacks were 
carried out on civilians in a manner inconsistent with the standing of civilians according to 
just war theory. In addition, those suspected of spying or collaboration were disciplined or 
killed. Both of these types of action could be construed as threatening to a presumption of 
moral equality. But in the case of the apartheid state, the threat is much more direct and 
thorough-going, for the offenses committed were done so from a position of power and in 
the service of a racist – deliberately and systematically demeaning – ideology and social 
system.  
Recognition in the TRC is aimed at vindicating all victims of humiliation; it amounts 
to a public commitment to avoiding such events in the future and an affirmation of 
individual rights. But it also involves more than this. For black South Africans, explicitly 
excluded from a world of equal concern under apartheid, it serves as a special ritual of entry, 
and a proclamation of the injustice of their exclusion. It thus functions as a symbolic 
vindication of those excluded from equal respect, and a vindication of the principles of equal 
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respect and equality before the law. So, in my view, the TRC’s response to human rights 
violations passes the test of publicity. 
Why is this not a sufficient response to the claims of victims of human rights 
violations? Why is a public statement or ritual vindicating victims not enough to defeat the 
challenge of the offense against them? The answer that an expressive theory of retribution 
gives is that the act of the wrongdoer functions socially as evidence that the victim is of no 
account.40 The actual humiliation makes it plausible to believe in the inferior status of the 
victim. This point may seem excessively metaphorical but perhaps we can understand it in 
the following way. Repeated acts of humiliation and cruelty, if left unchallenged, create a 
world in which the victims must live humiliated lives – to take an extreme example, the lives 
Jews had to eke out in concentration camps.41 One of the many terrible dangers of such a 
situation is that an observer may find it easier to conclude that such victims are inferior and 
deserve to be where they are.  
It is therefore not enough simply to deny the truth of the message of humiliation 
conveyed by the act; the evidence provided by the act must be more powerfully refuted. The 
repeated acts of lordship on the part of state operatives made their claims to greater worth 
plausible; to vindicate the victims, the offenders must be put in their place. The offenders 
cannot be seen to “get away with” their claim of relative superiority. If no significant penalty 
is imposed on some of the offenders, the victims (and others) may take this as further 
evidence that their society acquiesces in their humiliation – that it does not value them 
enough to act against their tormentors.  
In the aftermath of the Winnie Madikizela-Mandela hearings, Caroline Sono, the wife 
of murdered activist Lolo Sono, commented bitterly that the hearings showed that “there is 
no justice for little people like us in this country”.42 Hints made in 1998 about the possibility 
of issuing a blanket amnesty raised the prospect that not only failed amnesty-applicants but 
also people who had never come forward to the TRC would get off scot-free. Although this 
possibility has not materialized, there have not yet been any serious attempts to prosecute 
failed amnesty applicants. The criticism that the TRC process may leave intact and 
unchallenged the offenders’ sense that they were able to act against victims with impunity 
thus remains deeply disturbing. It suggests that to the extent that the recognition of victims 
conveyed by the truth commissions remains purely symbolic, it will not defeat the humiliation 
of victims conveyed by human rights violations.  
Here I want to make a partial concession to the restorative justice model of the TRC. 
Punishment is a powerful way of defeating the offender’s claim to superiority and the 
evidence for that claim provided by his ability to get away with it. It actually masters the 
perpetrator in a manner comparable to the way that he mastered the victim and therefore 
signals the refutation of his claim to mastery.43 But this punishment should not degrade the 
offender or convey the impression that the victim is now the master. In other words, this 
conception of retribution does not license the lex talionis, and it leaves room for considerable 
downward discretion in choosing how to punish, while outlawing upward discretion that 
would result in degrading punishment. Moreover, it recognizes that there are burdensome 
but non-painful penalties that can defeat the wrongdoer – forms of restitution, community 
service, etc.44  
 Thus, I think there is a case to be made on behalf of the TRC model, if it is 
understood as a moral compromise between justice and social unity in the way that I have 
outlined. The conditional amnesty process of the TRC gives up strict punitive justice, but it 
does not simply sacrifice individual claims for justice to a conception of national unity or 
national interest. Rather, the Victims’ Hearings affirm the importance of justice and the rule 
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of law, and function to recognize the dignity of victims and the injustice of the racist 
exclusions of whole categories of people from moral concern. In these ways, while the 
amnesty process does promote social unity and some degree of mutual understanding in a 
way that full-scale prosecutions would not have, its symbolic functions of recognition serve 
also as a tributary to criminal justice. Provided that hard choices are made, and some 
prosecutions of figures named by the Final Report are conducted, we may also conclude that 
the retributive goal of vindicating the innocent  - the “little people” – has not been betrayed. 
We should also acknowledge the necessity of the obligation to alert those claimed to be 
perpetrators of allegations involving them which the courts imposed on the TRC.45 While 
this may have distracted attention from the victims’ stories, it serves some of the retributivist 
goals of criminal justice – in particular, the goal of establishing who is an offender, so as to 
defeat the offender’s claim to superiority successfully. We should, finally, concede the point 
to restorative theorists that more needs to be done to fully vindicate victims and defeat their 
humiliation than merely affirming their dignity or punishing some offenders (through 
incarceration, for example).46 A greater commitment to restitution and social justice is indeed 
required – although this will have to involve institutions other than truth commissions. 
Ultimately, truth commissions have to be viewed as part of a larger process, and the final 
verdict on their role will have to wait. But their focus on human rights abuses is an essential 
founding element of this process. It begins – but does not end – a societal process of finding 
an appropriate response to past violence and injustice. Whether the global community will 
be able to sustain a commitment to such responses under present pressures is now an open 
question. That such a commitment is a vital resource, however, is clear. Though it is less 
exhilarating than Kant’s promise of perpetual peace, the new remedial sensibility of memory 
politics remains necessary in a world haunted by the ghosts of past atrocities and the all-too 
likely appearance of new injustices. 
 
   
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
1 See Kant 1970 (1798): 182-184.  
2 This view is articulated in “Perpetual Peace”. See Kant 1970 (1795): 113-114. 
3 For a valuable discussion of the Nuremberg Trials and their predecessors, see Bass 2000: 3-205. On the 
Genocide Convention, see Power 2002: 17-83, 155-163. Hannah Arendt’s account of the Eichmann Trial 
remains a classic. See Arendt 1963. 
4 Ignatieff 2001: 5. 
5 See Brooks 1999: 3 and Barkan 2000: 308-349. 
6 On these issues, see the disturbing discussion in Gray 2003: 59-70. 
7 This latter concern was of importance in South Africa, though it is not prominent in other transitions. 
8 For a slightly different list, see Adam and Adam 2001: 33. 
9 For helpful accounts of the TRC’s history and institutional structure, see Boraine 2000and Ntsebeza 2000.  
10 By far the best study of the politics surrounding the TRC is to be found in Wilson 2001. This is one of 
the few assessments of the TRC based on field research. It presents a bracingly skeptical view of the 
institution. See also Bell 2003. 
11 I have advanced this view elsewhere (Allen 1999). In that piece, however, I do not explicitly address the 
challenge of the “restorative model”. 
12 See Teitel 1999: 274-278, Teitel 2000, Teitel 2003: 69-94. 
13 Teitel 2000: 5. 
14 Ibid., 21. 
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15 Ibid., 66-67. 
16 Ibid., 225. 
17 See ibid., 83 
18 See Posner and Vermeule 2004: 764. 
19 Sanford Levinson makes the valuable point that most societies are undergoing some sort of transition, citing 
the stumbling attempts of Americans to address their past of racial injustice and slavery. Levinson’s point is not 
that there are no differences between what have been labeled “transitional” and “nontransitional” societies, but 
that the difference is typically exaggerated. See Levinson 2000: 211-216. For a related argument, see Valls 2003: 
53-71. 
20 For the idea of “political death”, see Bhargava 2000: 47. 
21 To avoid confusion, I should emphasize that du Toit emphatically rejects the idea that individual healing was 
the purpose of the TRC.  
22 For a stimulating discussion of the nature of legal recognition, see Honneth 1996: 107-121. Honneth in fact 
distinguishes three different forms of recognition – loving recognition afforded by the family (especially the 
mother-child relation), legal recognition, and social esteem afforded by communities of value and/or the state. 
I find his arguments for the necessity of the third form of recognition unconvincing, but his analysis of legal 
recognition is very valuable indeed. 
23 An excellent account of the connection between making a claim and being a rights-bearer, is presented in 
Feinberg 1980: 148-151. 
24 Andrew Ashworth traces the origins of restorative justice reforms to a greater concern with the victims of 
crime evident in the 1980’s and expressed in the adoption of a charter of victims’ rights in Australia in 1986, 
and the publication of The Victim’s Charter in Britain. See Ashworth 1993: 278-279. For a sample of work on 
practical developments associated with restorative justice, see the articles collected in Wright and Galaway 
1989.   
25 See TRC 1998: 126. See also Tutu 1999,Villa-Vicencio, 2000, and Leebaw 2003: 40. Teitel also claims that the 
second phase of transitional justice saw a greater emphasis on restorative conceptions of justice. See Teitel 
2003: 81. 
26 This point is made by Archbishop Tutu in his Foreword to the Final Report. See TRC 1998: 9. 
27 TRC 1998: 9. See also van Ness 1993: 259. 
28 See Braithwaite 2000: 115.  
29 Ibid., 119. 
30 Theorists of restorative justice differ over whether “punishment” has any place whatsoever in a criminal 
justice system (although some who reject the very idea of punishment accept the necessity for “penalties” 
aimed at promoting reintegration). There are also disagreements concerning the centrality of restitution to the 
process of reintegration. Although these differences are important, I cannot discuss them here. Instead, my aim 
is to construct a composite picture of the idea of restorative justice, based on what I take to be its most 
challenging and distinctive claims. 
31 For a view of this sort, see Kiss 2000: 82. 
32 Braithwaite describes “conferences” as a “meeting of two communities of care”, rather than as a meeting of 
individuals (2000: 120). 
33 Note the tendency to explain the meaning of reconciliation by means of illustrations drawn from personal 
relationships. See TRC 1998: 18-19. In similar vein, John Braithwaite explains his concept of “reintegrative 
shaming” with reference to conflicts and forms of reconciliation occurring within families. See Braithwaite 
1989: 56-57.  
34 Hugh Corder points out that the Amnesty Committee of the TRC consisted entirely of lawyers, while the 
two remaining committees were staffed mainly by non-lawyers. See Corder 2000: 103. 
35 Their thought is that amnesty should have been accompanied by decisions as to how perpetrators could 
“make amends”. See Llewellyn and Howse 1999: 387-388. 
36 This is borne out by a recent empirical survey that suggests that attributions of blame for human rights 
violations split clearly down racial lines in South Africa. See Gibson and Gouws 1999.  
37 Cragg, however, does not exclude punishment from criminal justice, and therefore is less vulnerable to these 
criticisms than other theorists. 
38 Braithwaite gives some attention to this problem and concedes that the “informality” of the shaming process 
may sometimes result in injustices (Braithwaite 1989: 157-161). But his response to this is to insist that the 
threat is diminished if shaming is “reintegrative” rather than “stigmatizing”. While this may avert some of the 
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especially unpleasant consequences of shaming, Braithwaite’s assertion does little to address the challenge of 
avoiding such outcomes in the first place. 
39 An important exception to this point is provided by the version of restorative justice offered by Jennifer 
Llewllyn and Robert Howse, who argue that retributivism and restorative justice share the intuition that crime 
disturbs a moral equilibrium.  
40 I am relying heavily here – and throughout my very sketchy discussion of expressive retributivism – on the 
work of Jean Hampton. See Hampton 1988 and Hampton 1992. An illuminating application of Hampton’s 
theory to the TRC is made in Markel 1999. 
41 For an analysis of the Nazi attempt to create a world of total domination in the concentration camps, see 
Arendt 1973: 437-457. 
42 Quoted in Bridgland 1998: A8. 
43 For a more extended argument, see Hampton 1988: 128. 
44 In other words, this account of expressive retributivism weakens the traditional commitment of retributivism 
to a strict version of the proportionality requirement (that the punishment should “fit” the crime). 
45 On this point, see Corder 2000: 103-104. 
46 On the issue of social justice, see Llewellyn and Howse 1999: 374 I address this question more fully in Allen 
1999: 332-335. 
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